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ABSTRACT 
Much debate exists in the international community 
about the most effective way to deal with the threat of 
North Korea.  A look back in history, especially in the 
case of United States’ past policies, will serve as an 
analogy and historically based perspective to apply to the 
North Korean problem. 
 The United States has employed both military 
engagement and economic engagement in various countries.  
Because of the regional parallels between the Korean and 
Vietnamese nations, our approach to the Vietnamese problem 
after the end of the Vietnamese war, a constructive 
engagement approach, was useful.  Expanding diplomatic and 
economic ties with an authoritarian government is the most 
effective way to help move it in the direction of free 
markets and democracy.   
This same strategy should be tried with North Korea.  
A military engagement of this country would be hard fought 
at the very least with no clear evidence that the results 
would not destroy the South Korean economy.  Military 
belligerence by the United States reinforces the dogma and 
perception of necessity of the current regime.  Economic 
engagement would slowly transform the current state in 
North Korea.  A well thought out historically based 
engagement strategy for countries that threaten to dominate 
other states is critical for the correct formulization of a 
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What is the relative effectiveness of military and 
economic strategies to contain states perceived to be 
threats to dominant powers?  The world community is faced 
with a continuous dilemma of how to deal with threatening 
states.  At various times Iran, Syria and North Korea 
inject themselves on to the world stage forcing the 
dominant power to make tough, foreign policy choices.  Iran 
and Syria support the growing insurgency in Iraq, 
prolonging the United States in military engagement.  Iran 
has nuclear ambitions and supports the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and Palestinian resistance movements in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  Syria supports Hezbollah in 
Lebanon creating what seems to be a never-ending tragedy in 
that war-ravaged country.  
Endless diplomatic missions and military threats keep 
most of these states compliant for the short term.  This, 
however, does not solve the issue of long-term policies 
toward these states.  The issue then is not how to deal 
with them in the short-run but how to formulate a correct 
engagement strategy to contain the threat. 
North Korea for many years has frustrated the 
international community with its nuclear ambitions and 
propensity to export missiles to other problem states.1 As 
early as 1965, with the Korean War still a troublesome 
memory, the “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung established the  
 
                     1 Bertil Lintner, “Korea, The Long Reach of North Korea’s Missiles,” 
AsianTimesOnline, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HF21Dg02.html, accessed September 6, 
2006. 
2 
Hamhung Military Academy to conduct research into missile 
technology.  In his inaugural speech before the academy, he 
stated,  
If war breaks out, the US and Japan will also be 
involved.  In order to prevent their involvement, 
we have to be able to produce rockets, which fly 
as far as Japan.  Therefore, it is the mandate of 
the Military Academy to develop mid and long-
range missiles.2  
Much debate exists in the international community 
about the most effective way to deal with the North Korean 
problem.  Two distinct camps of opinion have emerged: 
military engagement and economic engagement.  Using 
historical analogies of past United States conflicts, it 
will be demonstrated that the economic engagement strategy, 
not military engagement strategy, is a correct strategy in 
the North Korean case.  
“The lessons of history are never simple; whosoever 
thinks he sees one should probably go on with his reading.”3 
History is an important factor to consider when deciding on 
which course of action to follow.  History, however, must 
be used in context with all evidence available to make the 
right choices.  This is especially true of United States 
foreign policy.  It is critical to keep in mind the 
possible impact of history on policymaking.  I will use 
historical examples to determine which engagement strategy 
is correct, but it is important to note the limitations and  
 
                     2 Bertil Lintner, “Korea,, The Long Reach of North Korea’s Missiles,” 
AsianTimesOnline, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HF21Dg02.html, accessed September 6, 
2006. 
3 John K. Fairbank, “The Meaning of Vietnam,” New York Review of 
Books, XXII, June 12, 1975, 3. 
3 
dangers of this approach.  This impact of history used for 
policymaking can be summarized in four points outlined by 
Ole R. Holsti, 
1. The propensity to rely upon history as a 
strategy for coping with complexities and 
uncertainties in decision making is rather 
widespread; 
2. An inadequate understanding of history can 
result in costly policy errors, but it does 
not follow that the introduction of 
historical thinking into policy 
deliberations will necessarily improve the 
quality of either decision making process or 
the resulting choices; 
3. Some types of historical episodes, such as 
traumatic events that have been experienced 
first-hand, are especially likely to live on 
in “the reality world of the mind”; 
4. A particular dramatic (or traumatic) episode 
may indeed be the crucial formative event 
for those who experience it, but they will 
not necessarily interpret its significance 
in an identical manner.4 
Acknowledging the limitations of a historical 
approach, this thesis will focus on which engagement 
strategy is appropriate to contain the threat of North 
Korea.  To do this, I will compare historically two of the 
United States foreign policy engagement strategies; 
military engagement and economic engagement.  These 
comparisons will then be applied to the North Korean 
problem and will help define a clear direction for the 
United States’ North Korean engagement policy.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In reviewing available literature, two distinct camps 
have emerged on how to deal with this problem: military 
                     4 Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, 107. 
4 
engagement and economic engagement.  The first advocates 
military engagement to solve the North Korean problem.  
They argue that North Korean state power is armament and 
military power and can only be overcome by superior forces.  
They believe that military power should be used more 
quickly, with fewer self-imposed constraints.5 Victor Cha, 
and David Kang, (co-authors), North Korea: A Debate on 
Engagement Strategies6  and Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two 
Koreas7 are two primary leaders of this view.  The military 
engagement camp feels the United States is faced with a 
continuous dilemma of how to deal with rogue states.  At 
various times Iran, Syria and North Korea inject themselves 
on to the world stage forcing the United States to make 
tough foreign policy choices.  North Korea for many years 
has frustrated the United States with its nuclear ambitions 
and missile exports and by counterfeiting United States 
currency.  This camp contends, especially with North Korea 
and its failure to respond to economic incentives in the 
past, that military engagement is the appropriate method in 
North Korea’s case regardless of the consequences. 
The counter view supports economic engagement with 
North Korea, like South Korea’s now defunct “Sunshine 
Policy.”  Economic engagement strategies are favored by 
such prominent figures as former President Jimmy Carter, 
“Engaging North Korea,”8 and Ambassador Robert Gallucci,9 
                     5 Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy, 139. 
6 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, eds., Nuclear North Korea, A 
Debate On Engagement Strategies, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003, 88-92. 
7 Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas, State Capital and Military 
Power, New York: Routledge , Taylor and Francis Group, 1999, 4. 
8 President Jimmy Carter, “Engaging North Korea,” New York Times, 
October 27, 2002. 
5 
“Negotiating with Nuclear North Korea,” and from authors 
like Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula,10  
and Aidan Foster Carter, Korea’s Coming Reunification,11 who 
all clearly support this point of view.  Classic examples 
of this economic strategy are Vietnam, after the guns had 
been silenced,12 and China, the Ukraine, Georgia, Croatia 
Bosnia and Kazakhstan.13   
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on which engagement strategy is 
most effective to mitigate or minimize the threat of North 
Korea.  To do this, I will do a comparative analysis of the 
results of the United States’ military and economic 
engagements in Vietnam.  Vietnam was chosen because of the 
parallels between the domestic unpopularity in the United 
States of the Korean War and Vietnam War and because of the 
cultural links, based on Confucian legacies, between the 
Korean and Vietnamese nations.  This analysis will then be 
applied to the North Korean problem and will help define a 
clear direction for the United States’ North Korean 
engagement policy.  Using historical comparisons of 
Vietnam, it will be demonstrated that the economic 
                     9 Robert Gallucci, “Negotiating with Nuclear North Korea,” 
Washingtonpost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A10405-2002Nov5&notFound=true. 
November 6, 2002, A 21, accessed September 8, 2006. 
10 French, North Korea The Paranoid Peninsula, A Modern History, New 
York: Zed Books, 2005. 
11 Aidan Foster Carter, “Korea’s Coming Reunification,” 
http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/26/3iie2555.pdf#search
=%22Aidan%20Foster%20Carter%2C%20Korea's%20Coming%20Reunification%22, 
accessed September 8, 2006. 
12 John R. Dodsworth et.  al., Vietnam: Transition to a Market 
Economy, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996, 18-26. 
13 Joseph Nye, “America’s Information Edge: The Nature of Power,” 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0996/ijge/gjcom6.htm, March 
2006, accessed March 28, 2007. 
6 
engagement strategy, not military engagement strategy, is a 
correct strategy in the North Korean case. 
A word of caution: this thesis will focus only on the 
North Korean problem.  Each situation the United States 
faces in the world community should be reviewed 
differently.  A North Korean blueprint cannot necessarily 
be applied to Iran or Iraq for example.  This thesis is not 
an indictment of current United States policy in the Middle 
East despite the parallels between unpopular wars.   
As an intelligence professional for more than 24 
years, I have some knowledge of the North Korean situation 
and will employ this experience in this thesis.  My 
assumption is that economic engagement is the correct 
strategy for the problem state of North Korea.  As 
Americans, we often times look at world issues through 
American eyes and apply our standards, morals, and 
backgrounds to arrive at prejudged solutions.  It is 
helpful to look at an issue from the perspective of those 
involved.  
I believe that North Korea is a threat, and the only 
way to engage them is through economics.  American 
companies in China and Vietnam helped to open these 
Communist countries.  My rationale is while North Korea is 
certainly more closed than these two countries, the same 
strategy will work.  With this said, more acknowledgements 
must be made.  Many believe that introducing western style 
consumer goods is not something that would easily evolve 
the North Korean government.  The problem with the North 
Koreans is Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il who are the 
sole focus of the North Korean people.  The cult of 
personality is so strong and so ingrained in the North 
7 
Koreans that no amount of economic persuasion can break the 
grip of the “Great Leader” and “Dear Leader.”  North 
Korea’s history has shown that it has never responded to 
attempts to bring them into the world community.  North 
Koreans live in a world so detached from reality that it 
possibly can only be changed by the destruction of its 
regime and a period of re-educating the youth of North 
Korea.  The older generations are so indoctrinated that 
they are probably forever lost.  In this case, South Korea 
would be left to deal with the remnants of a shattered 
society and, it would take several generations for the 
North Koreans to function in a society such as South Korea. 
Even though this pessimistic view of North Korean 
prospects is a real possibility, the fact remains that 
economic engagement could work, but in a subtle less 
threatening way than perhaps in other countries.  This is 
the only option that could work without destroying North 
Korea and much of South Korea.  My thesis will attempt to 
show that Vietnam, more than the other examples noted 
above, gives us strong parallels to the Korean situation 
and may provide the answers desperately needed for North 
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II. BACKGROUND: A CONCISE HISTORY OF NORTH KOREAN 
COMMUNISM 
How did we arrive at this point?  To understand this 
we must look briefly at the Korean War and at North Korea 
to see how it evolved into its current state.  The official 
name of North Korea is the Democratic Peoples Republic of 
Korea, (DPRK). 14  Technically, it became a country on 9 
September 1948 even though the country was effectively 
under the control of occupying Soviet forces.15  In 1946, 
the Soviets installed Kim Il-sung as head of the North 
Korean Provisional People’s Committee.16  Kim would 
eventually become the General Secretary of the Korean 
Workers Party, (KWP), Prime Minster and President of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  Kim had spent most 
of World War II in or working with the Soviet Union, and, 
because of this, he introduced a Soviet style government in 
the DPRK with power concentrated mostly in the KWP.17 
After the Korean War, there were many versions of the 
communist party in the DPRK.  There was a Chinese leaning 
faction as well as a Soviet faction competing for power in 
the newly formed country.18  The Soviet Union, because of 
its occupation used its leverage to ensure that North  
 
 
                     14 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/2.htm, accessed September 8, 2006. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig., North Korea Through the Looking 
Glass, The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.: 2000, 4-24. 
17 Ibid., 24. 
18 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/2.htm, accessed September 8, 2006. 
10 
Korea’s new leaders were those who followed the Soviet 
model and had spent time in the Soviet Union during the 
Second World War.   
A. THE KOREAN WAR 
After World War II, some latent hope remained of a 
unified Korea.19  It soon became apparent that this would 
not happen with the consolidation of Kim’s power in the 
North and Syngman Rhee coming to power in the South.  Kim 
Il-sung believed that the only way to reunify Korea was 
through force and actively pursued both Chinese and Soviet 
support for an invasion.  This in combination with a war 
weary United States’ withdrawal of forces from South Korea 
gave Kim Il-sung the opportunity he needed to launch an 
invasion.   
The South had a marginal army while Kim, with the 
assistance of the Soviets, had spent the early years of his 
regime building up the heavy industries and producing a 
military that could overwhelm South Korea by 1949.20  North 
Korea possessed a core of revolutionaries in its armed 
forces that had seen combat time against the Japanese 
during World War II.  The South was inexperienced and had 
less proficient armed forces. 
Stalin initially had reservations about Kim’s plans, 
but once the Soviets had developed an atomic weapon, his 
opposition to an invasion had moderated.  A Chinese 
communist takeover in China and an emboldened, nuclear-
armed Soviet Union gave Kim’s invasion plans renewed life.  
In 1950, Stalin approved an invasion of the South by Kim’s 
                     19 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/2.htm, accessed September 8, 2006. 
20 Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas, State Capital and Military 
Power, Routledge , Taylor and Francis Group, New York: 1999, 62-65. 
11 
“People’s Army.”  North Korean forces attacked on 25 June 
1950, moving quickly toward Seoul, driving South Korean 
forces into a tiny section of the country around Pusan.21  
The United Nations intervened, driving the North Koreans 
north across the 38th parallel and capturing the North’s 
capital, Pyongyang, by October of 1950.  The Chinese soon 
joined the fight driving the UN forces out of North Korea 
recapturing Pyongyang and then Seoul by January of 1951.  
By March, United Nations forces had recaptured Seoul and 
established a stable front along the 38th parallel where the 
Armistice Line was established in 1953 and has remained 
since.22   
After the war, Kim Il-sung moved rapidly to 
consolidate his power once again with massive show trials 
and executions of potential rivals.  Kim was able to do 
this because of continued Soviet and North Korean military 
support.  Pak Hon-yong, the leader of South Korea’s 
communist party, was put on trial in the North and blamed 
for the failure of a popular uprising by the people of 
South Korea to support their North Korean brothers in the 
liberation of Korea.23  He was executed along with most of 
the leftists who had defected from the South to North Korea 
during the war.  In this way, Kim paved the way for his 
immortality in the eyes of the North Korean people. 
                     21 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/2.htm, accessed September 6, 2006. 
22 Richard W. Stewart., General Editor, Volume II The United States 
Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003, The Korean War, 1950-1953, of Military 
History, Center American Military History, United States Army 
Washington, D.C.: 2005, 218-249. 
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III. NORTH KOREA VS. SOUTH KOREA MILITARY STRENGTH 
Before assessing in greater detail the societal 
differences between the two Korean states, it is important 
to succinctly examine both sides of the strategic issue 
when deciding the correct course of action for North Korea.  
The table below shows that South Korean vs. North Korean 
military strength in manpower and materials seems to favor 
the DPRK.   
 
Table 1.   North Korea vs. South Korea military strength24 
 
Bbl = Barrel of Oil (1 bbl = 42 US Gallons or 159 liters)  
NR = Not Reported  
South Korea Military Strength North Korea Military Strength 
 South Korea Country North Korea   
   Flag    


























 1,481 Aircraft 1,624  
 4,650 Armor 6,560  
 5,528 Artillery 21,400  
                     24 GlobalFirePower.com, “World Military Strength,” 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries_comparison_detail.asp, 
accessed August 31, 2006. 
14 
South Korea Military Strength North Korea Military Strength 
     
  South Korea Country North Korea   

















 5 Major Ports 11  
 0 (bbl per day) 
Oil 
Production 0 (bbl per day)   
 2,168,000 (bbl per day) 
Oil 
Consumption 25,000 (bbl per day)   
 NR 
Proven Oil 
Reserves  NR  
 $14,000,000 
Arms 
Exports $NR  
 $103,000,000 
Arms 
Imports  $NR  
 97,252 Km Roadways 31,200 Km   
 3,472 Km Railways  5,214 Km   
 1,608 Km Waterways 2,250 Km   
 98,480 Sq Km Land Area 120,540 Sq Km   
 108 Airports 79  
 23,530,000 Labor Force 9,600,000  
 $956,300,000,000 
Purchasing 
Power  $40,000,000,000  
 $210,400,000,000 
Gold 
Reserves  $NR   
 
This data, however, does not tell the entire story.  
North Korea has an active 1.1 million soldier army with 
most of it poised along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
running along the 38th parallel.25  North Korean artillery 
                     25 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, s.v. “North Korea,” 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CNAS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country
=Korea,%20North&Prod_Name=CNAS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/
nkors100.htm@current, accessed August 24, 2006. 
15 
pieces number in the thousands with many of them aimed at 
Seoul, just a few miles south of the DMZ.  South Korea as 
well has a capable standing military, but it is much 
smaller than North Korea’s.  However, a small number of 
United States troops, in and around the Demilitarized Zone, 
would slow an attack until reinforcements arrive.  This 
balance of power has remained virtually unchanged since the 
Korean War truce in 1953. 
Militarily, North Korea was supplied with some of the 
Soviet Union’s most advanced weaponry.  In the 1980’s North 
Korea received advanced fighter aircraft such as Mig-29s, 
front-line tanks, and superior surface to air missile 
systems such as the SA-5 from the Soviets.  This presented 
a substantial threat to the Republic of Korea.26  North 
Korea continued to develop long-range missiles and embarked 
on a nuclear program that has the world concerned to this 
day.  In the 1980s, North Korea presented a formidable 
military force.27  After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
fortunes of the North Korean military declined rapidly.  
Soviet weapon systems no longer were repaired by Soviet 
technicians, spare parts became non-existent and military 
readiness declined because of a series of floods and 
subsequent poor crop yields that caused mass starvation of 
the North Korean population.  While the regime supplies the 




                     26 GlobalSecurity.org, “Korean Peoples Army,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm, accessed 
September 8, 2006. 
27 Ibid. 
16 
was still felt on the armed forces.  Today, North Korea, 
while still a powerful military force is severely weakened 
and vulnerable.28 
 
                     28 GlobalSecurity.org, “Korean Peoples Army,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm, accessed 
September 8, 2006. 
17 
IV. COMPARISON OF NORTH KOREA VS. SOUTH KOREA 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
The two Koreas could not be more polarized on the 
socio-economic scale.  The South after years of military 
dictatorships has emerged as a burgeoning Asian economic 
power.  By 2000, the South’s economy was more that thirty 
times the size of the North’s where its policies of self-
reliance have produced even greater desperation.  The South 
has emerged as one of the world’s top economies.  In Gross 
Domestic Product, South Korea ranks 13th in the world. Since 
the 1980s, South Korea has become a functioning democracy.29  
This democratic system has shown the capability of electing 
opposition candidates such as the one-time dissident, Kim 
Dae-jung.  The South Korean people enjoy a standard of 
living rivaling those of Japan, the United States, and 
Europe.  Education levels and literacy are high as well in 
the southern portion of the peninsula.  South Korea has 
unfettered freedom of religion, in fact, South Korea is an 
Asian center for Christian evangelism and some of the 
largest protestant churches in the world are located in 
Seoul. 
The North is a closed state with a communist 
dictatorial government in complete control.  North Korea is 
a country isolated from the realities of the world 
community, and a regime desperate to stay relevant to its 
people.  “The North Korean regime and its practices are an 
anathema to nearly every civilized value.  The starving of 
children; the relative deprivation that forces farmers to 
sell their daughters for Chinese cattle; the physical 
                     29 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/2.htm, accessed September 6, 2006. 
18 
handicaps that a generation of youth will bear due to a 
basic lack of nutrition and medicine all occur while the 
political regime and military survive in relative 
splendor.”30 
How did it go wrong for North Korea?  Following the 
Soviet model, Kim established complete control of all 
aspects of the country to include instituting a command 
economy and nationalizing large percentages of indigenous 
North Korean industry.  This allowed the KWP to control all 
of the country’s manufacturing for both export and internal 
consumption.  All aspects of the economy from money flow to 
infrastructure upgrades and improvements were carried out 
only by the state.  Agriculture followed the communist 
policy as well.  Land was seized and redistributed to the 
peasant classes, and the command economy dictated 
production goals and quotas.  Following the example of 
China and the Soviet Union, collectivization was instituted 
in the 1950s, and by 1960, almost all agricultural 
production had reverted to collectivization.   
North Korea followed the communist theory of diverting 
all available resources into heavy industries; military 
production became one of its highest priorities.  Products 
for the benefit of its people, such as consumer goods, were 
neglected in deference to the state.  North Korea’s command 
economy paid workers a low fixed rate for wages and 
products and used the surplus to finance its 
industrialization effort.31  In short, North Korea followed 
the classic communist command economic model during its 
                     30 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “In North Korean Hunger, Legacy is Stunned 
Children,” New York Times, December 16, 1998. 
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early years.  The results of this industrialization 
increased the living standard of its population up through 
the 1960s.32  The economy produced great quantities of heavy 
machinery for agriculture and manufacturing but lacked the 
capacity to produce consumer goods for its expanding 
workforce.  Following the Korean War, the North Korean 
economy and industrial production was restructured to 
prewar levels.  The destruction that occurred during the 
war resulted in many opportunities for the North to 
continue its heavy industry focus.  However, by the 1960s 
the North Korean economy was beginning to become sluggish 
much like most communist command economies of the period.  
The difference in income distribution between rural and 
urban areas became greater because of stagnation in the 
production of agriculture.   
North Korea’s continued massive spending on military 
procurement and crumbling existing infrastructure led to 
economic stagnation and increasing debt.  This military-
first thinking was shaped by the world that confronted 
North Korea.  Kim Il-sung’s thinking was outlined in a 
report entitled, ‘Current Situation and the Task for Our 
Party’.  In his speech on October 5th 1966, Kim criticized 
‘American imperialists’ and ‘Japanese militarism’.33  He 
then issued an address titled ‘On the Construction of 
Socialism and Reinforcement of Our Socialist Bastion’; Kim 
argued… 
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For the unification of our country and the 
victory of Korean revolution, it is necessary to 
build socialism and revolutionary energy in the 
northern part of the Republic.  We need to 
promote the construction of socialism and to 
strengthen our revolutionary bulwark politically, 
economically and militarily, by mobilizing all 
efforts of the party and the people.  The most 
critical point in our task of revolutionary 
struggle is to promote economic development and 
military buildup simultaneously for the purpose 
of reorganizing socialist construction and 
national defense against the possible attack from 
the enemy…  We have to maximize economic 
development as well as to reinforce our defense 
capability by all means.34   
North Korea’s self-guiding philosophy of self-reliance 
and its resistance to foreign interferences only compounded 
its problems. The guiding self-reliance philosophy of the 
North Korean state is called “Juche.”  What is Juche?  The 
1998 revised version of the DPRK’s constitution, which 
reinforced Juche, stated unequivocally in Article 20 that 
“the means of production are owned solely by the State and 
co-operative organizations.”35  Juche is an original theory 
by Kim Il Song, the Soviet installed father of modern North 
Korea.  This theory maintains that North Korea will move to 
independence economically without the help of foreigners.  
It follows Marx’s theory of economic growth except for one 
important point: according to Marx, capitalism is a 
necessary stage in the evolution of socialism to communism.  
The workers will be key to eventually evolving the country 
to a communist utopia.  Marx felt that technological change 
was the major factor of the whole economic system.  
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Technological change would allow capitalists to exploit 
workers fully until they were completely useless and 
eventually displaced.  This would cause great social 
change.  He felt that capitalism was just a part of the 
evolution toward socialism.  Each stage of technological 
advancement created a different stage of class struggle 
which led to a higher form of social order.  He felt 
capitalism brought a very high stage of technological 
advancement, which would lead to a class struggle between 
workers and capitalists.  The workers would win and lead 
the nation and economy into a full socialist society.  The 
consequences are that poverty would disappear and the state 
would eventually disappear as well in this socialist 
state.36  In the Juche theory, “The process toward 
independence involves the development of an independent 
national economy through Charip or self-sustainability, and 
a nation capable of its own self-defense through Chawi or 
(self-defense).”37 
There is no capitalist stage in the Juche theory of 
North Korea.  This theory has enabled North Korea to 
equivocate between the Soviet Union and China, allowing Kim 
Il-sung to favor either side as needed.  Kim saw no need 
for the capitalist phase of the Marxist cycle.  The power 
of the people would be enough to move into the stages of 
communism envisioned by Marx, without class struggles.  Kim 
did, however, keep some of the Marxist tenets he liked but 
with a North Korean twist.  Kim skillfully combined 
Confucian tradition, Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism to form 
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his Juche philosophy, without acknowledging the 
contributions of each.  He applied these revolutionary 
ideas to Korean social structures to form the economic and 
military philosophy to guide his country.38   
North Korea’s economic fortunes continued to decline 
and were complicated by the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.  The 
modest improvement to political discourse has not been 
accompanied by a shift in military readiness.  Trade 
certainly has a positive impact on the North Korean 
economy, but the extent is difficult to determine because 
it is a closed system, and the DPRK does not report its 
numbers.  Additionally, South Korean reporting is 
inconsistent because it views its dealings with North Korea 
as inter-Korean trade and does not report its interactions 
as foreign trade, which is more easily tracked.39  The DPRK 
also engages in illegal arms sales, drug trafficking, and 
narcotics, which provide a stream of hard currency income, 
that is difficult to trace.  Yet another source of income 
comes from its diasporas living in other countries, 
including the Chosen Soren group living in Japan40. 
While Kim attempted to seek assistance from both 
sides, the Soviet Union believed that Kim had moved toward 
supporting the Chinese and began to severely reduce 
military aid, technology transfer and credit granting to 
Kim’s DPRK.  This forced North Korea to rely on a less 
technically advanced China for aid and technical expertise.  
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Kim, in fact, was not an enthusiastic supporter of Mao 
Zedong’s policies during the early years of the People’s 
Republic of China and felt that his policies, such as the 
Great Leap Forward, Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the 
Cultural Revolution were foolish and dangerous.  These 
factors pushed the North Korean economy further into 
oblivion.  
In the 1970s, North Korea’s Soviet style economy, 
which relied on heavy industry, had declined and was no 
longer able to produce enough to support the floundering 
North Korean economy.  Capitalist areas of the world were 
outstripping command economies by moving into advanced 
stages of industry, moving away from heavy coal burning 
industries.  Countries, such as the North’s mortal enemy 
South Korea, were reaping the benefits of an aggressive 
market economy.  The entire Soviet block was being left 
behind both economically and socially.  South Korea’s 
economic prosperity led to the formation of a stable 
democratic government with an emerging capitalist market 
driven economy in stark contrast North Korea.  South Korea 
instituted major economic reforms starting in 1970 that led 
progressively to it passing North Korea economically and 
militarily by the mid 1970s.41 
North Korea and its leader Kim Il-sung found it 
difficult to respond to its prosperous neighbor and became 
increasingly alarmed that this well armed economic giant 
undermined the legitimacy of the North Korean leadership.  
Kim realized that he had to do something.  In China, Deng 
Xiaoping was instituting reforms by opening China to 
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foreign investment and instituting a dual track economic 
system, but because of Kim’s distrust of Chinese economic 
methods and his own Juche philosophy, he did not follow the 
Chinese model.  Kim opted instead to focus his country back 
on his Juche or self-determination path.  This exacerbated 
North Korea’s isolation from the world, discouraging 
investment and preventing needed technological upgrades to 
his faltering industrial production and agricultural 
sector.  By 1980, North Korea had defaulted on all of its 
foreign loans, and by the end of the century; its 
industrial output was in a perpetual decline. 
Today the North Korean economy is described as “the 
possibility of Perestroika, the impossibility of 
Glasnost.”42  This means that North Korean leadership, out 
of desperation, has explored the process of economic 
liberalization without any hint of political 
liberalization.  This seems to imitate China’s initiatives 
in the 1990’s to open a dual track economy.  Deng Xiaoping 
decided to open China economically, slowly by allowing 
foreign direct investment first while maintaining a state 
controlled command economy.  Slowly other sectors of the 
economy were opened allowing market pressures to change the 
economy without the economic and social upheavals that 
occurred with the breakup of the Soviet Union.  The results 
have been a steady economic transformation of the Chinese 
economy without any significant changes to the political 
reality in China.43  This appears to be the model that North 
Korea is trying to pursue.  Granted, North Korea has not 
instituted the reforms that the Chinese have, and this has 
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led to some serious economic problems for this isolated 
country.  The North Korean economy is a command directed 
economy.  Because of this, reform is extremely difficult.  
Even though North Korea has looked at the Chinese 
example, its economy is structured like that of the former 
Soviet Union.  In China, only about 20% of the population 
was working in the industrialized sectors when Deng began 
his reforms.  In North Korea, over 90% of the work force is 
engaged in highly industrialized State Owned Enterprises, 
(SOEs).  While China could make economic reforms and affect 
only 20% of its population, major reforms in North Korea 
would affect the social benefits of over 90% of its 
workers; this puts North Korea in a precarious position, 
much like that of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries.44  Another crucial difference between 
North Korea and China is FDI.  Because of North Korea’s 
Juche philosophy, foreign investment has been viewed as 
something unnecessary by this self-sufficient workers 
paradise.  In fact, in 1980 Kim Il-sung declared, “North 
Korea was a self sufficient socialist economy with no need 
for foreign capital.”45  China’s economic experiment was 
characterized by massive amounts of foreign investment, 
while North Korea experienced very little direct investment 
from abroad.  Any potential investment was stifled by the 
regime’s habit of defaulting on foreign debts and its 
propensity to put rigid controls of any foreign endeavor in 
North Korea.  Kim Jong-il has begun to realize that foreign  
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investment is essential to improving the economy, but the 
track record of the regime leads to caution and hesitance 
of potential investors.   
According to South Korean observers, North Korea 
classifies its citizens into three ranks and fifty-one 
categories based on their ideological orientation. The 
categories are then used to allocate rations for daily 
necessities, jobs, and housing.  The North Korean military 
and political elite enjoy privileges far above that of the 
average citizen.  While starvation plagues the provinces, 
the elite drive foreign cars, acquire imported home 
appliances, and buy imported food, medicines, and 
toiletries at special hard currency stores.46 
North Korea seems unable to rid itself of its Juche 
philosophy.  This is slowly strangling the country, placing 
it in a desperate economic situation.  The leadership 
recognizes that a liberalization of the economy is 
necessary.  This, however, in North Korea is not as easy as 
it may seem.  To adopt economic openness would be like 
admitting that Kim Il-sung and his philosophy of Juche were 
wrong.  This is not possible in today’s North Korea.  Kim 
Il-sung is the god of the North Korean people.  Unlike Mao 
and Stalin in China and the former Soviet Union, Kim Il-
sung is forever the savior of the North Korean people.  Mao 
and Stalin were seen as great leaders but they were never 
looked upon as gods.  In fact, once they moved on, 
succeeding leaders of both countries blamed their 
predecessors for failed economic policies and used this as 
an excuse to pursue other economic paths.   
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In North Korea, Kim Il-sung is the foundation of the 
North Korean state.  A 1981 KWP editorial may have said it 
best.   
Kim Il-sung ... is the great father of our 
people....Long is the history of the word father 
being used as a word representing love and 
reverence ... expressing the unbreakable blood 
ties between the people and the leader.  Father.  
This familiar word represents our people's single 
heart of boundless respect and loyalty....  The 
love shown by the Great Leader for our people is 
the love of kinship.  Our respected and beloved 
Leader is the tenderhearted father of all the 
people....  Love of paternity ... is the noblest 
ideological sentiment possessed only by our 
people.  His heart is a traction power attracting 
the hearts of all people and a centripetal force 
uniting them as one....  Kim Il-sung is the great 
sun and great man ... thanks to this great heart, 
national independence is firmly guaranteed.47   
He is the president forever for the DPRK.  Kim Jong-
il’s legitimacy is based on his father’s legacy and 
continued worship within the country.  Kim Il-sung’s 
ancestors are revered revolutionaries dating back to the 
1800s.  North Korean propagandists claim the entire family 
to be of noble birth.  This propaganda machine fabricates 
every aspect of North Korean society.  Children learn 
stories and accounts of the Kim family’s exploits; they are 
taught that North Korea could not exist without the 
guidance and benevolence of Kim Il-sung and his family.  
The people believe that while their lives are desperate, 
they live in the only functioning society in the world.  To 
change economic philosophies from Juche would admit that 
the “The Great Father,” was wrong.  This is not possible 
and not something the current North Korean regime could 
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consider.  “Even if a serious reform program were 
attempted, it is by no means preordained that such a 
program would be successful.  The three robust predictors 
of success in reforming centrally planned economies are the 
degree of macroeconomic stability at the time that reform 
is initiated; the legacy of a functional pre-socialist 
commercial legal system; and the size of the agricultural 
sector.”48 
The North Korean people suffer a continuing 
deterioration of living standards.  The results of the 
communist dictatorship and its ruinous policies of self-
determination and isolation have placed North Korea in the 
ranks of one of the poorest and most backward countries on 
earth.  The gap between the living standards of the 
citizens of South Korea compared to those in the North is 
immeasurable.  A comparison of the two German nations prior 
to reunification is not analogous to the Korean situation.  
Such a gap in socio-economic status has unforeseen 
ramifications for a unification of the Korean peninsula.  
This adds to the idea that economic engagement will lessen 
the shock of a future reunification of the Korean people. 
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V. EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 
The leadership of the DPRK regards "survival" as 
the first in a lexicographic set of preferences, 
and the regime has a history of confounding 
predictions of its demise.  Moreover, for the 
last decade it has been enabled by neighbors who, 
for their own reasons, prefer its continued 
existence to its disappearance.  The amount of 
external assistance necessary to keep it on 
"survival rations" is not large.49 
For more than twenty years after the Korean War ended 
in 1953, contacts between the two Koreas were virtually 
non-existent except for the military confrontations 
outlined in the DMZ incidents table located at the 
appendix.  North Korea at one time was one of the most 
feared militaries in Asia.  It showed the propensity to 
take military action to achieve its aims.  The capture of 
the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance 
plane, and the killing of an U.S. army officer in the DMZ, 
all demonstrated the hostility of the North Korean regime.  
The USS PUEBLO was a U.S. Navy vessel sent on an 
intelligence mission off the coast of North Korea.  On 
January 23, 1968, the USS PUEBLO was attacked by North 
Korean naval vessels and MiG jets.  One man was killed and 
several were wounded.  The eighty-two surviving crewmembers 
were captured and held prisoner for eleven months.50   
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Aside from Panmunjom meetings, official contact 
between North and South Korea did not occur until 1971, 
consisting mainly of Red Cross contact to try and reunite 
separated families as a result of the Korean War.51  “In 
1991, the South North Basic agreement acknowledged that 
reunification was the goal of both governments.  However 
divergent positions of the process of reunification and 
North Korean weapons programs, compounded by South Korea’s 
tumultuous domestic politics and the 1994 death of North 
Korean leader Kim il-sung, contributed to a cycle of 
warming and cooling relations.”52   
Relations entered a zenith with the election of Kim 
Dae-Jung as the Republic of Korea’s president in 1997; he 
favored a dove-like approach toward North Korea.  This led 
to a historic inter-Korean summit in June of 2000; however, 
revelations of continued North Korean nuclear activity and 
North Korean opposition to the United States’ policies in 
the Middle East have led to a steady decline in relations 
on the Korean peninsula. 
North Korea has not reduced the number of its troops 
along the DMZ.  There have been a number of incidents, 
including an attack on a South Korean patrol boat that left 
four dead and 19 wounded in June of 2002.  Another incident 
was an exchange of small arms fire across the DMZ in July 
of 2003 followed by a South Korean patrol boat firing 
warning shots at North Korean boats in violation of South  
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Korean territorial waters in August 2003.  Both governments 
dismissed these incidents and continued on the sunshine 
path.   
In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. They then expelled all International 
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and announced a decision to 
resume its nuclear weapons program. Six party talks resumed 
in 2005 for a fourth round where all agreed to a 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Joint 
statement committed North Korea to “abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an 
early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.”53 The statement 
additionally committed the United States and the other 
parties to certain actions as North Korea began to 
denuclearize.  “The United States offered a security 
assurance, specifying that it had no nuclear weapons on 
South Korean territory and had no intention to attack or 
invade North Korea with nuclear or other weapons.  Finally, 
North Korea and the United States were to take steps to 
normalize relations, subject to North Korea implementing 
its denuclearization pledge and resolving other 
longstanding concerns.”54  
At the time this seemed to be a major breakthrough 
that all parties had sought for almost fifty –years, but 
North Korea failed to return for continued talks.  Most 
recently, on July 5, 2006, North Korea test fired a 
ballistic missile despite widespread requests not to; these 
                     53 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, October 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm, 
accessed October 26, 2006. 
54 Ibid. 
32 
requests came from many nations including its top three 
trading partners, China, South Korea, and Japan.  The 
latest six-party talks that took place in China in February 
of 2007 have produced a possible agreement for North Korea 
to suspend nuclear activity in exchange for monetary and 
fuel considerations.55  This agreement sounds strikingly 
similar to the failed agreements of 1994.  North Korea has 
shown an unwillingness to abide by international agreements 
such as the 1994 Agreed Framework in respect to its nuclear 
ambitions.56  Whether this agreement holds in 2007 remains 
to be seen. 
Given the checkered history of the North Koreans, many 
in the world community ask what will be the next step in 
dealing with Kim and his regime in the North.  Two basic 
groups have emerged.  Some believe North Korea must be 
dealt with as a country that must be forced to conform to 
international standards as a civilized nation before any 
appeasement can be considered.  They point to the fifty 
plus years of South Korean and American engagement and the 
North Korean’s resistance to change as a reason to be 
hawkish.  Others feel that the reason for the continued 
problems with the North is our lack of meaningful 
engagement that will change the North once and for all.  
Both a hawkish view and economic view will be outlined in 
the following chapters. 
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VI. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: HAWKISH 
“United States intelligence has detected signs that 
the North Korean military is preparing an underground test 
site for a possible nuclear explosion.”57  The pro-military 
engagement camp views North Korea as a threat that can only 
be dealt with militarily. North Korea cannot be coped with 
by using soft power engagement models.  
This camp feels that North Korea must me changed 
before its nuclear capabilities mature.  A nuclear-armed 
North Korea would be beyond a military solution and past 
history has demonstrated the irrationality of North Korean 
leadership.  An unprovoked nuclear attack on Tokyo or 
Honolulu is not beyond the realm of possibilities.   
On the humanitarian side, the United States is 
obligated to relieve the suffering of the North Korean 
people.  The starvation of millions is inhumane, and as the 
remaining superpower, we must act.  If we can liberate the 
people of Iraq, why do we not do the same for the people of 
North Korea?  An argument can easily be made that the North 
Koreans are more oppressed than the Iraqis were, and that 
Kim Jong-il is a far greater threat to the world than 
Saddam Hussein was. 
Military proponents point out that South Korea today 
is ready to take on the economic impact of reunification.  
South Korea’s economy is one of the strongest in the world.  
It is in a much stronger position economically than West 
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Germany was when it reunified with the East.58 Most South 
Koreans would disagree but the economic numbers prove it.59  
Militarily, North Korean is the sixth largest Army in the 
world.60  Its capitol Pyongyang is the most heavily 
fortified city in the world.  Surface to air missiles 
surround the country’s industries, transportation, and 
leadership.  A cult leadership under Kim Jong-il runs the 
country.  Nearly all able-bodied males between the ages of 
18-30 are in uniform.61  The United States estimates that 
North Korea’s defense expenditures have been at least 30 
per cent of its total budget, or 20-25 per cent of its 
GNP.62  War would accomplish the demolition of the current 
North Korean regime and would probably lead to many 
desirable consequences.  It would provide relief for the 
multitude of starving North Koreans who cannot wait until 
economic engagement improves their plight. 
When Kim Il-sung died in 1994, his son Kim Jong-il 
succeeded him as General Secretary of the Korean Workers 
Party.  The post of President was eternal, but Kim Jong-il 
also became the Chairman of the National Defense 
Commission, the nation’s highest administrative authority.  
With these two positions, Kim Jong-il became the de facto 
head of the North Korea.  He immediately began a campaign 
of military appeasement to ensure its support, which was 
essential for the survivability of his regime.  The armed                      58 J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Comparative Economics in a Transforming 
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forces, headed by Defense Minister Oh Jin-wu, supported the 
younger Kim by late 1994.  Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea 
continued a program of military buildup, spending more than 
a quarter of its GNP on armaments, including development of 
nuclear weapons alarming the world community.  Kim Jong-
il’s military buildups and nuclear ambitions cause the 
military engagement camp to point out the need to prepare 
to confront North Korea militarily.  They feel this will 
occur sooner than later, and the world should be vigilant 
and not be dissuaded by North Korean feints at becoming a 
functioning member of the world community. 
These feelings sum up the passion of those who 
advocate a military first, hawkish stance in dealing with 
North Korea.  The argument is that with a morally bankrupt 
regime any engagement, especially economic engagement, is, 
tantamount to supporting the regime.  Countries such as 
North Korea should be regarded not as moral deviants to be 
reprimanded, but as security problems that must be solved.63  
Many people cannot accept the thought of compromising the 
moral high ground even to the extent of risking all out 
war.   
So will this United States’ policy of military 
engagement work for North Korea?  Looking at the sunshine 
period of 1998-2006, the military engagement camp feels it 
is clear that while there were some modest gains in 
relations between North Korea and South Korea, it seams 
economic engagement and trade are not significant 
deterrents to North Korean acts of aggression.  (See 
appendix) 
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North Korea is a country that only responds to 
superior force.  Its view of self-reliance, Juche, prevents 
it from integrating or opening itself to the world and the 
influences it brings.  This camp believes a necessary 
precondition to force North Korea to change is to have a 
coalition of participants willing to use military force.  
Without a consensus, implementing any other form of 
coercion to put pressure on North Korea is unworkable.  The 
hawks believe that North Korea needs to be dealt with from 
a militarily threatening position to end the regime once 
and for all.  
The proponents of the military first option point to 
three key reasons why this is the correct engagement policy 
for North Korea.  First, economic engagement or appeasement 
of North Korea places blind faith in the DPRK’s ability to 
reform and does not build a coalition with the ability to 
respond to North Korea when needed.  Choosing engagement 
strategies such as South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward 
North Korea buys time for the regime and fails to expose 
the North’s unchanged intentions.  Second, if the DPRK 
reverts to “attention-inducing” behavior, then the likely 
American response will be a punitive one.64  It is better to 
recognize the intentions of North Korea early and deal with 
them rather than procrastinating.  Third, if all other 
engagement strategies fail, military responses like 
preemptive action, massive retaliatory strikes (in response 
to a DPRK missile launch or artillery barrage), creating 
food distribution centers off DPRK shores and borders, and 
offering guarantees of safe havens for refugees should be 
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taken.65  Implicit in this view is the conviction that early 
unification of the peninsula should be viewed as an 
investment in the future.  This is considered the only 
strategy for North Korea because of its track record of 
non-compliance and deception.  This camp points out that 
the time is now to deal with North Korea.  The United 
States and the Republic of Korea should undertake a 
reorientation of their military posture on the peninsula, 
focusing more on long-range deep-strike capabilities to 
force the DPRK to scale back forward deployments in defense 
of Pyongyang.66  
Millions of its people have died and countless other 
deaths are imminent.  Its military is degraded and the 
regime has adopted policies that cannot be tolerated by the 
world: entrance into the nuclear club of nations.  Clearly, 
these proponents of the military option embrace the current 
U.S. administration.  President George W. Bush in his 
January 2002 State of the Union speech stated in regard to 
states like Iran and North Korea;  
States like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger … In any of these cases, the price 
of indifference would be catastrophic … Time is 
not on our side.  I will not wait on events, 
while dangers gather.  I will not stand by, as 
peril draws closer and closer.67 
                     65 Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiation Strategy, 
Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 1999, 28. 
66 Cha, Nuclear North Korea, A Debate On Engagement Strategies, 98. 
67 United States White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 
accessed, August 18, 2006. 
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Those who favor military action to resolve the North 
Korean problem feel now is the time to engage it 
militarily.  A weakened military force, with a population 
starving and in desperate need of help, all contribute to 
an opportunity for military action that cannot be 
squandered.  This perspective has some merits, but it must 
be considered in the context of societal engagement 
alternatives that are evaluated in the next section. 
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VII. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: SOCIO-ECONOMIC   
Before making the case that an economic engagement 
strategy is the most effective way to reduce the threat of 
problem states, an acknowledgment must be made.  Often, 
economic reforms lead to a delay in political reforms.  
Economic liberalization allows an authoritarian regime to 
remain legitimate in the eyes of its people because it is 
seen as bringing increased prosperity to the country.  Over 
time, however, the competitive pressure inherent in the 
liberalization of economies leads to increased convergence 
with capitalism.68  Similar to the Chinese Communist Party 
in the Peoples Republic of China, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party has survived intact despite a declining commitment to 
core principles of state ownership, elevated role of the 
working class, and ideas of economic justice.  These core 
principles have been rejected in favor of nationalism and 
Vietnam’s ability to compete in the world economy.  This 
points out that in transitioning economies like China and 
Vietnam there may be benefits of continued authoritarianism 
until a democratic change naturally occurs via the 
pressures of the marketplace.  This stability of government 
and economic change permits development of broader social 
foundations for future democratization, including a growing 
middle class and legal institutions created to deal with 
societal conflicts.  The authoritarian state supports this 
as a way of delaying demands for further political 
liberalization and to force societal demands into areas 
which it can control.  Reform and economic openness produce 
economic change without political liberalization in the 
                     68 Mary E. Gallegher, “Reform and Openness,” World Politics 54, no. 3 
(2002), 338-72. 
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short term but it also produces a reduction of societal 
resistance to reform, buying the existing regime time to 
implement politically difficult reforms and to reformulate 
the ideological foundation of their legitimacy to rule.  In 
short, economic openness slowly evolves an authoritarian 
regime by forces of the market. 69   
In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung initiated 
his Sunshine Policy of engagement with the DPRK, which 
includes economic incentives in the form of trade.  On its 
northern border, China remains North Korea’s top trading 
partner and provider of aid although its contributions are 
less than requested.70  The natural question that arises is 
whether the trade is having the desired effect of making 
North Korea more stable and less likely to initiate 
conflict. 
North Korea’s primary security concern is a military 
strike by the United States with the goal being regime 
change.  At the same time South Korea extended offers of 
economic benefits and increased ties, President Bush 
labeled North Korea a part of the “Axis of Evil.”71  For Kim 
Jong-il, continued existence has to take precedence over 
economic enticements.  As long as the United States has 
troops on Korean soil and refuses to renounce the 
preemptive use of force as an option, North Korea will 
                     69 Mary E. Gallegher, “Reform and Openness,” World Politics 54, no. 3 
(2002), 338-72. 
70 According to Andrew Scobell on page 5 of “China and North Korea: 
From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arms Length,” in 1996 North Korea 
requested a large amount of grain and China only offered one tenth of 
the requested amount. North Korea responded by threatening to improve 
relations with Taiwan. China increased its offer, but it still did not 
reach the requested levels.  
71 President George W. Bush. “State of the Union Address,” January 
29, 2002, accessed September 8, 2006. 
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continue to view socio-economic measures as secondary to 
the United States military threat. “America’s trade 
leadership can build a coalition of countries … Open 
markets are vital for developing nations, many of them 
fragile … that rely on the international economy to 
overcome poverty and create opportunity; we need to answer 
for those who ask for economic hope to counter internal 
threats to our common values.”72  
The socio-economic engagement camp argues there is 
potentially an immense power of United States’ economic 
forces to change cultures and minds of people and 
governments.  American businesses have the same effect on 
countries once they are established. Corporations sense 
untapped markets for consumer goods and do everything 
possible to placate host governments. The result is to make 
those countries less hostile to the United States by subtly 
changing the minds of the populace, which eventually 
influences the government.  They believe this economic 
strategy is what changed the rogue state of Vietnam after 
the guns had been silenced.  “A strong world economy 
enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and 
freedom in the rest of the world.  Economic growth 
supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs 
and higher incomes.  It allows people to lift their lives 
out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform and the 
fight against corruption, and reinforces the habits of 
liberty.” 73   
                     72 Kevin Sullivan, “US Relations Change Suddenly for Mexico,” 
Washington Post, September 20, 2001. 
73 National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, 
Office of the White House, September 17, 2002, at 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss6.html, accessed September 8, 2006.    
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United States foreign policy that does not take into 
account the results of past military lessons learned is 
unwise in today’s increasingly complicated environment.  
The former Soviet Union collapsed not because of a United 
States’ invasion, but by economic forces that overcame and 
undermined the communist government’s legitimacy and 
ability to govern.  
The economic engagement camp sees broad benefits from 
engaging totalitarian regimes in the marketplace.  As in 
the former Soviet Union and China’s case, economic 
prosperity is an unquenchable drive for people of oppressed 
societies to demand change.  As an example, Elisabeth 
Rosenthal, a New York Times reporter, described driving her 
kids to soccer practice in China.   
We drove in a sport-utility vehicle (most 
probably made by Beijing Jeep, a joint venture 
with Chrysler), loading up on toilet paper at 
Price Smart, and stopping by one of 40 McDonald’s 
for a Big Mac and then Dairy Queen or Baskin-
Robbins for a sundae.  Therefore, this is what 
the Communist Party means by ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’!  But isn’t this what 
it’s like in Des Moines?74   
Once closed command economies cannot survive the 
pressures of the market place.  Big Macs, DVD players, 
computers and other consumer goods push people toward a 
demand for change that Marx or Engels, and economic systems 
inspired by them cannot hope to overcome.  Changes occur 
naturally, sometimes without the authoritarian regimes 
realizing it.  On occasion, the state does realize that the 
only way to survive is by instituting changes to ensure its 
survivability.  Today, China and Vietnam, while still 
                     74 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Funny, I Moved to Beijing and Wound Up in 
Pleasantville,” New York Times, 15 November 1998, 7. 
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Communist, are not imminent threats to the United States.  
They argue that this strategy reduces or eliminates the 
threat while military engagement creates many more 
problems. 
The conclusion on Vietnam seems to be apparent today 
and is salient because of the cultural and regional 
parallels with North Korea.  The current Vietnamese Prime 
Minister is not a democratic leader, and there have been 
only a few democratic reforms in the government.  My 
argument that increasing economic engagement slowly evolves 
governments by economic pressure into more democratic 
regimes does not seem to be happening in Vietnam yet.  But, 
the fact remains that this country is a major trading 
partner and not a threat to the United States. The United 
States made a decision to engage and open Vietnam even 
though it remains a tightly controlled political Communist 
state.  The Vietnamese Communist Party that led the war 
against the United States a few decades ago is being 
welcomed without reservations by America's political and 
business leaders.  “The United States President and 
Secretary of Defense have met the Prime Minister of 
Vietnam.  Business leaders such as Microsoft head Bill 
Gates have hosted Vietnamese delegations and the country 
recently signed an agreement to purchase four Boeing 
jetliners.”75  The potential exists for similar progress in 
U.S.-North Korean relations. 
The success of socio-economic engagement can be 
clearly seen in the Chinese and Vietnamese cases.  On the 
one hand, when dealing with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and 
                     75 Leon Hadar, “Trading, Not Invading: US Hums a Different Tune In 
Vietnam,” AntiWar.com, http://antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=6457, 
accessed August 31, 2006. 
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Cuba, the United States has insisted that economic 
sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the use of military 
power ("regime change")  is an approach that can be 
described as U.S. "destructive disengagement"76 toward these 
governments.  The belief is this the only way to transform 
totalitarian systems and authoritarian regimes into 
democracies and free-market economies.  
In the cases of China and Vietnam, the exact opposite 
appears to be true.  Our approach to the Vietnamese 
problem, given its tenuous ties with China that are similar 
to PRC-DPRK tensions, was based on constructive economic 
engagement and on the idea that expanding diplomatic and 
economic ties with an authoritarian government is the most 
effective way to help move it in the direction of free 
markets and democracy.  Coming in the wake of normalized 
U.S.-PRC relations in the Nixon, Ford and Carter years, 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam 
were restored in 1995 under President Clinton.  Since then, 
two-way trade has risen to $6.4 billion in 2004 from $451 
million in 1995.  After a bilateral trade pact in 2001, the 
United States has become Vietnam's key trade partner.77  
Many of the United States’ key allies in the region joined 
in this economic engagement strategy for Vietnam.  This 
could occur in North Korea too.  Japan is now one of 
Vietnam’s top trading partners and investors.78  Given 
                     76 Leon Hadar, “Trading, Not Invading: US Hums a Different Tune In 
Vietnam,” AntiWar.com, http://antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=6457, 
accessed August 31, 2006. 
77 Leon Hadar, “Trading, Not Invading: US Hums a Different Tune In 
Vietnam,” AntiWar.com, http://antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=6457, 
accessed August 31, 2006. 
78 Associated Press, “Vietnam Leader to Visit Japan,” Thursday, 
October 12, 2006, 
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/061012/vietnam_japan_trade.html?.v=1, accessed 
October 17, 2006. 
45 
Japan’s proximity to North Korea and interest in North 
Korean issues, Japan might apply that paradigm to the DPRK 
too.   
At the same time, Vietnam has taken small steps toward 
opening its economy and political system and has made 
commitments to implement new legislation on religious 
practice, allowing churches to open and ending detention of 
religious leaders.  According to opinion polls, most 
Vietnamese, especially young people, admire American 
culture and business.  This may suggest that perhaps the 
United States ended up winning the Vietnam War after all. 79   
What is almost certain is diplomatic and economic 
engagement with Vietnam has made it more likely that the 
Americans, not the communists, are now winning the hearts 
and minds of the Vietnamese people, while American 
businesses make money and American consumers have access to 
cheap products.  In short, economic engagement in Vietnam 
is a cost-effective strategy.80  Moreover, the lessons the 
United States has learned about socio-economic engagement 
in Vietnam reinforces the lessons learned in China, with 
post-Soviet central Asian states, in the Balkans and in 
post-World War II reconstruction efforts in Europe and 
Asia. 
                     79 Leon Hadar, “Trading, Not Invading: US Hums a Different Tune In 
Vietnam,” AntiWar.com, http://antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=6457, 
accessed August 31, 2006. 
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VIII. DEVELOPING A UNITED STATES SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
STRATEGY TOWARD NORTH KOREA 
What is the answer for North Korea?  The initiation of 
the Sunshine Policy marked the first positive trend in the 
North Korean economy since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Some progress in cross-DMZ relations has been made, 
but progress is slow and marked with minor crises.  
Official and unofficial contact is increasing in level and 
frequency, including the South Korean President’s visit to 
Pyongyang in 2000, the first leader-to-leader summit since 
Korea’s division in 194581.   
Since it is impossible to accurately determine North 
Korea’s actual GDP, it is useful to look at its legal trade 
and its estimated GDP growth rate to estimate its 
dependence on foreign trade.  Examination of Figure 1 and 
Table 1 reveals that in recent years North Korea exports 
about $1 billion and imports about $2 billion, leaving it 
with a $1 billion trade deficit annually.  The degree of 
North Korean reliance on trade becomes apparent when viewed 
against the backdrop of the 2003 estimate of the DPRK’s 
annual GDP as $23 billion.82  Based on the information 
presented here, North Korea is highly dependent on foreign 
trade to maintain positive (though meager) GDP growth. 
 
 
                     81 Wan Ming. “Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation: 
Mitigating Conflict and Transforming Security Order in Asia,” in Asian 
Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah 
Alagappa. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, 295. 
82 Ibid., 2. 
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Figure 1.   Growth in Real GDP in the DPRK, 1990-2003 (From: 
Bank of Korea83) 
 
Table 2.   North Korean Trade by Selected Trading Partner.  
Selected Years, 1994-2003 ($ in millions) (From: 
Bank of Korea84) 
 
South Korean data from Republic of Korea, KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Agency) 
Overseas Offices. World Trade data from International Monetary Fund, Direction 
of Trade Statistics. Country data from World Trade Atlas. World sum is the 
total North Korean trade plus trade with South Korea. *World Total for 2003 
estimated by KOTRA. 
                     83 As cited in Dick Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery. “The North Korean 
Economy,” 5. 
84 As cited in Dick Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery. “The North Korean 
Economy,” 12. 
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The literature on how to deal with North Korea is 
split in opinion, but it appears that economic engagement 
is the appropriate policy for the North Korean problem.  
South Korea has easily surged ahead of North Korea 
economically.  The good news is that peaceful unification 
is certainly possible as both Koreas are deeply 
nationalistic.85  “Their economies are in a broad sense 
complimentary and could fit together if the political and 
economic difficulties of transition could be handled.  That 
the latter would be serious is seen by the high costs of 
reuniting East and West Germany, where the income gap was 
not as great as it is between the two Koreas.”86  
Even though there seems to be some common ground 
economically between the two Koreas, other factors would 
diminish the shock of reunification.  Both share a 
competitive spirit and a strong Confucian identity.  
Another key that could provide a rallying of both peoples 
is a common disdain for the Japanese.  While problematic 
for the United States, this would be a nationalist uniting 
point for both Koreas.  Both Koreas possess two of the 
hardest working labor forces as measured by the length of 
the workweek. 87 They also share a respect for education 
that has led to nearly universal literacy, as well as very 
rapid growth rate of high-tech education among their 
populations.  South Korea has a higher percentage of its  
 
 
                     85 Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, 
Second Edition, 517-520. 
86 Ibid., 570. 
87 Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989, 205. 
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student-age population in college (36 percent, 23 percent 
in North Korea) than any other country except the United 
States and Canada.88   
The bad news is the North Korean economy is in a 
shambles; millions of people have starved because of famine 
and mismanagement by the current regime.  “North Korea is 
already experiencing significant macroeconomic instability 
and in terms of the sectoral composition of output and 
employment, the North Korean economy more closely resembles 
Romania and parts of the former Soviet Union than the 
agriculture-led Asian reformers.”89 
In the midst of a crisis, that threatens its 
existence, North Korean leaders have not tried serious 
reform or an open-door policy.  They fear that it would 
bring the regime to an end, i.e. the ‘reunification by 
absorption’, and they are probably correct.90  Military 
belligerence by the United States reinforces the dogma and 
perception of necessity of the current regime.  Economic 
engagement, much like what happened in China and Vietnam, 
could slowly weaken the current leadership in North Korea 
if they do not respond to it creatively.   
Kim Dae-jung, a one-time dissident, was elected 
president of South Korea and in 1998 instituted the 
“Sunshine Policy.”  This contradicts the military 
engagement literature, which believes unification is the 
key to the success of Korea, even if it is done via force.  
                     88 Byoung-Lo Kim, Two Koreas in Development: A Comparative Study of 
Principles and Strategies of Capitalist and Communist Third World 
Development, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1992, 91. 
89 Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two 
Koreas, Washington: Institute for International Economics, (2000). 
90 Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas, State Capital and Military Power, 87. 
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Sadly, Kim’s Sunshine Policy was stopped because of 
corruption that occurred during his administration in early 
2002.91  The pro-military camp points to this corruption as 
proof that only a military solution is possible for North 
Korea.  A different version of the “Sunshine Policy” has 
been tried by Kim Dae-jung’s successor as Republic of Korea 
president, Roh Moo-hyun, since 2002 without concrete 
success.  President Roh’s policy is called “Policy of Peace 
and Prosperity.”  The modest improvement to political 
discourse has not been accompanied by a shift in military 
readiness. 
The economic engagement camp believes the United 
States should take the initiative and institute its own 
Sunshine Strategy.  They feel we must convince the North 
Koreans that it is in their best interest to open its doors 
to the West.  “Trade policy as anti-terror weapon is an 
understandably appealing idea.  It doesn’t put American 
soldiers in harm’s way.  It is nonviolent, market friendly, 
and holds the promise of draining the swamp of hostility.  
And it doesn’t require a funding line in the federal 
budget.”92  Historical examples of military and economic 
strategies reveal the correct policy to deal with states, 
such as North Korea, is economic engagement.  
Vietnam gives us a clear picture of both strategies 
put into action. The United States entered the Vietnam 
conflict in the early 1960’s as military advisors to the 
then South Vietnam government engaged in a conflict with 
communist North Vietnam.  United States policy makers 
                     91 Paul French, North Korea The Paranoid Peninsula, A Modern History, 
250-251. 
92 Alan Tonelson, “There’s Only So Much That Foreign Trade Can Do,” 
Washington Post, June 2, 2002, B1. 
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believed that military force could defeat the communists 
from the North.93  As a result of the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident in 1964, the advisory role of Americans escalated 
into direct military action upon orders of President Lyndon 
B. Johnson to target enemy military installations.  Year 
after year American troop levels were increased in an 
attempt to eliminate the North Vietnamese threat.  
Following the Tet offensive in 1965 until 1975, the United 
States eventually committed some three million troops in an 
attempt to defeat the communist insurgency into the South.  
Military support from the communist North and material and 
logistical aid from the Soviet Union prevented the United 
States from defeating this insurgency.  By 1970, the United 
States steadily turned over combat roles to the South 
Vietnamese and began to withdraw its forces from the 
country.  All American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam 
by 29 March, 1973.  The Paris Peace Accords in January of 
1973 formally recognized the sovereignty of both the North 
and the South.  United States advisors and support troops 
stayed in South Vietnam until April of 1975.  After 14 
years and 58,000 dead, the United States withdrew from 
Vietnam94. The war continued however until the North 
overpowered the South and reunified the country on 30 April 
1975.  The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was born. This 
tragic chapter in United States military history 
demonstrated that military engagement had failed to change 
the threat of North Vietnam and actually created a 
communist united Vietnam stronger than before the war. 
                     93 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, New York: The Viking Press, 
1983, 18. 
94 Karnow, Vietnam, A History, 9. 
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In 1986, the communist leadership of Vietnam 
implemented economic reforms known as “Doi Moi,” 
(renovation).  During the 1990s, economic growth was rapid 
and the United States, driven by business pressures, 
allowed American corporations to start to explore economic 
ventures into the communist country of Vietnam.95  An eager 
Vietnamese government searching for answers to communist 
manifested economic woes, allowed American companies to 
invest capital into the Vietnamese economy and American 
products flooded the market from cigarettes to American 
movies.  Vietnam’s French Colonial period and familiarity 
with Western culture only facilitated this move toward 
economic reforms.96  This started to expose the Vietnamese 
to many of the West’s ideals and created a demand among the 
population for consumer goods supplied only by the West.  
This evolution not only arose in the population, but to 
leadership as well.  Vietnamese leaders were able to create 
for the first time in its history, real economic growth and 
rise in per capita income.  Diplomatic relations were 
established between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
the United States in 1995.97 The once centrally planned, 
failed economy changed gradually to a market economy due to 
the influences of economic engagement.  An economic 
engagement strategy accomplished the effective removal of 
Vietnam as one of the world’s threatening states. 
United States’ economic policy is formally outlined in 
the National Security Policy of the United States.98  I 
contend that economic engagement is the appropriate policy                      95 Karnow, Vietnam, A History, 11. 
96 Karnow, Vietnam, A History, 9. 
97 Ibid., 10. 
98 National Security Strategy of the United States. 
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for the North Korean problem. “Neither foreign investments 
nor trade will greatly flow to the decrepit DPRK because 
other states offer economic freedom and prospects for 
better financial returns. But ceasing economic conflict 
will remove the United States as a scapegoat for its 
economic backwardness and can help smooth its eventual 
integration into the global economy. Otherwise, when 
communism does expire in North Korea, the United States, as 
the sole superpower and a major adversary, could face the 
economic equivalent of a toxic dump. Modest economic growth 
will lighten our load, help the people of North Korea, and 
pave the way for a peaceful reunification of the two 
Koreas.”99   
The North Korean economy is in a shambles, millions of 
people have starved because of famine and mismanagement by 
the current regime.  A blueprint for this, but on a much 
grander scale, is the South Korean government instituted 
“Sunshine Policy” for North Korea.  Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine 
Policy had three guiding principles: (1) no toleration of 
armed provocation of any kind; (2) no unification by 
absorption (i.e. no German-style process); and (3) the 
active promotion of inter-Korean reconciliation and co-
operation, starting first with those areas of mutual 
interest on which both could readily agree.  What South 
Korea hoped to accomplish is to slowly open up North Korea 
through an economic engagement policy, thus minimizing the 
impact of a future reunification economically.  The United 
States should institute its own “Sunshine Strategy.”  We 
must convince the North Koreans that it is in their best                      99 Thomas H. Henriksen, “It’s Time to End Sanctions against North 
Korea,” Hoover Digest No. 4, 1998, Hoover Institute, 
http://www.hooverdigest.org/984/henriksen.html, accessed August 31, 
2006. 
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interest to open to the West but in a way that is subtle 
with a long-term view.  Economic engagement works in its 
own way at its own pace.  It may not be immediate, but 
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IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES’ NORTH 
KOREAN ENGAGEMENT POLICY  
The obvious question is will the North Koreans be 
receptive to economic engagement.  The simple answer is 
nobody knows because it has not been tried before. The 
legacy of the Korean War and continued hostility with the 
world’s lone superpower influences every aspect of North 
Korean behavior. The DPRK historically does not respond to 
overt actions.  They feel any encroachment is a threat to 
their “Juche” philosophy.  We must convince the North 
Koreans that it is in their best interests to open to the 
West but in a way, that is patient with a long-term view.  
“Moreover, successful diplomacy will require a decisive 
move by Pyongyang to open and reform its moribund economy. 
The continued deterioration of North Korea is reflected in 
the floods and structural damage to its agriculture, food 
shortages, and six years of negative economic growth 
averaging about -5% annually. In official statements, 
foreign investment laws, and the creation of the Rajin-
Sonbong free trade zone in the far Northeast corner of the 
country, there is indeed ample evidence that Pyongyang 
recognizes the need to embark on a new course.”100 
So how can the United States facilitate this?  How do 
we implement economic engagement with North Korea?  How can 
we make it work? A key factor is an economic coalition.  
All regional players, South Korea, Japan and China, have a 
vested interest in a prosperous Korean peninsula.  The 
demise of a North Korean regime would lead to a period of                      100 Robert A. Manning, “Desperation Focuses the Mind: What Next on 
the Korean Peninsula?” Global Beat Issue Brief 19, Center for War, 
Peace and the News Media at New York University, 
http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib19.html, accessed October 26, 2006. 
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economic sacrifice that South Korea is not prepared for.101  
China has begun to lay the groundwork for a Tibet like 
buffer state to rule North Korea if the Kim regime does not 
survive.102 Japan fears a united Korea for both military and 
economic reasons.103  The United States must act to prevent 
the consequences of a collapsed North Korea.   
So what must the United States and South Korea do in 
order to bring North Korea into the world economy, to 
engage it economically?  I suggest the best way is to start 
simply, to give the North Koreans a chance to be 
successful.  Allow the Koreans, both North and South, to 
work on improving relations with each other.  As an 
example, during the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, a joint 
statement provides us a blueprint on how to proceed.   
The South and the North have agreed to resolve 
the question of reunification on their own 
initiative and through joint efforts of the 
Korean people, who are the masters of the country 
… Acknowledging that there are common elements in 
the South’s proposal for a confederation and the 
North’s proposal for a federation of a lower 
stage as the formula for achieving reunification, 
the South and the North agreed to promote 
reunification in that direction … The South and 
the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust 
by promoting balanced development of the national 
economy through economic cooperation and by 
stimulating the cooperation and exchanges in 
civic, cultural, sports, public health, 
environment and all other fields.104  
                     101 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Menace of North Korea,” The Atlantic, 
October 2006, 72. 
102 Ibid., 72. 
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104 Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and 
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Let the two Koreas begin the engagement without 
interference.  To facilitate this, the United States needs 
to retool its approach toward North Korea.  Kim Dae-jung 
the former South Korean President summed it up best,  
The issue of the Korean Peninsula goes beyond 
inter-Korean relations.  It is an issue that 
concerns the whole of Asia and the world.  
Moreover, peace on the Peninsula is not just 
limited to the military level, but directly 
linked to economic prosperity, human rights and 
democracy.  I believe the Six-Party framework, 
(United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea 
and North Korea), should not restrict itself to 
being just a temporary meeting to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear issue.  I believe it should 
develop into a permanent multilateral 
organization for the promotion of peace and 
democracy on the Korean Peninsula and in East 
Asia. 105 
A bellicose United States stance toward North Korea 
compels the Kim regime to become even more radical.  The 
North Koreans detonated a nuclear warhead on September 9th 
2006 for the stated purpose of urging the United States 
back to the negotiating table.  North Korea for the first 
time was straightforward and honest about their intentions.  
This honesty is a desperate cry from a dying country and 
regime.  Kim Jong-il realizes his plight and is trying to 
leverage the only advantage he has.  Now is the time for 
the United States to act in a positive way toward North 
Korea.  A continued adversarial stance, increased 
sanctions, and further condemnation will only entrench the 
North Korea regime into an irrational defensive position 
and condemn the North Korean people to more suffering.   
                     105 Kim Dae-jung, “Regionalism In The Age Of Asia,” Global Asia, A 
journal of the East Asia Foundation, Volume 1, Number 1, September 
2006, http://globalasia.org/issue/issue01.php?idx_chk=A, accessed, 
February 21, 2007. 
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The first step for the United States is to end the 
armistice that has kept the United States, South Korea, and 
North Korea at war for over fifty years.  A peace agreement 
would allow the North Koreans to feel, for the first time 
in their history, as if they are a real country not subject 
to the continuing threat of the lone superpower.   
A second step would be to continue the development 
ties that exist or resume initiatives that have been 
started and ended for some reason.  These include 
reconnecting the Seoul to Sinuiju Railroad and highway, 
continuing the joint Imjin River flood prevention project, 
and enhancing the development of foreign investment areas 
such as the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.  The Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex is especially appealing because it is an 
example of corporations with a profit motive moving into 
North Korea and beginning the economic engagement process.  
This project was the result of an agreement between South 
Korea’s Hyundai Corporation and North Korea.  This complex 
once completed would use South Korean technology and 
capital with North Korean labor to help North Korea develop 
small businesses needed to enter into world markets.106  “As 
of September 2006, 13 South Korean firms were manufacturing 
goods with North Korean labor in the Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex (KIC). Most of the goods are sold in South Korea; a 
small quantity is being exported to foreign markets. South 
Korea has been pushing to include Kaesong-produced goods in 
its free trade agreements with other countries, including 
the United States, although the U.S. Trade Representative 
has been clear that such an arrangement would be 
                     106 Byung Chul Koh, Korea: Dynamics of Diplomacy and Unification, 
Monograph Series, Number 12 (Claremont McKenna College: Keck Center for 
International and Strategic Studies, 2001) 34. 
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unacceptable to the United States. Ground was broken on the 
complex in June 2003, and the first products were shipped 
from the park in December 2004. Plans envision 250 firms 
employing 350,000 workers by 2012.”107  These efforts by 
both South Korean and United States corporations are 
critical for economic engagement working in North Korea. 
                     107 U.S Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, October 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm, 


























Why does it matter whether the United States chooses 
an economic strategy or military strategy? A historically 
based engagement strategy for states that threaten dominant 
powers is critical for the correct formulization of a 
viable United States foreign policy in this ever-volatile 
world.  The United States is the last superpower, and 
because of this, it carries an obligation to act 
appropriately on the world stage.  In 2004, a survey 
conducted among South Korean citizens found that South 
Koreans viewed the United States as a bigger threat than 
North Korea to South Korea.108  Why is this?  Perhaps it is 
our failure to view the lessons of history as glimpses into 
the future.  History gives the United States valuable 
insights into the consequences of its policies.  On a 
practical note, the United States cannot sustain military 
action to counter every threat that occurs in the world.  
Financially it would be ruinous and democracy would suffer 
by the example of a military first policy.  It is critical 
that the United States determines the best engagement 
policy for each threat.  The North Korean situation is 
heart rending.  Millions have died and will continue to die 
until the threat posed by the current North Korean state is 
reduced or changed.  An economic engagement strategy makes 
sense.  What is stopping the United States?  Is it lack of 
proof that economic engagement works, or is it lack of an 
historical perspective applied to today’s problems.  
Clearly, economic engagement should always be considered.  
                     108 Choe Song-won, “S. Koreans: U.S. a Bigger Threat than N. Korea,” 
Stars and Stripes (Pacific ed). January 16, 2004. 
http://www.estripes.com/articleprint.asp?section=104&article=19067&arch
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APPENDIX. 
Table 3.   Korea Demilitarized Zone Incidents.109  Serious 
Incidents in the DMZ 1967 – 2004 
 
DATE INCIDENT NUMBER KILLED 
NUMBER 
CAPTURED 
21 Jan 68 
31 nK armed agents intruded 
into Seoul in an attempt to 
assassinate President Park 
29 (nK) 1 (nK) 
23 Jan 68 
nK gunboats seized the USS 
Pueblo in the Sea of Japan, 
over 15 nautical miles off the 
nK coast.  82 crew members 
released on 23 Dec 68 
1 (US)  
14 Apr 68 
nK intruders ambushed a UNC 
JSA security guard truck 
enroute to JSA 
2 (US)  2 (ROK) 
20 Aug 68 nK agent boat intercepted off Cheju Island 
12 (nK) 2 (nK) 
30 Nov 68 nK landed approximately 120 nK commandos near Samchok, ROK 
107 (nK) 2 (nK)  
1969 
More than 150 nK agents were 
killed while attempting to 
infiltrate into the ROK from 
the sea 
150 (nK)  
15 Mar 69 
nK fired upon a UNC work party 
that finished replacing MDL 
marker 0022 
 
1 (US) 2 (US) 
1 (ROK) 
15 Apr 69 
USN EC-121 recon aircraft was 
shot down by two nK MIGs 90 
miles off the nK east coast 
31 (US)   
5 Jun 70 
A ROK Navy "1-2" ship was 
fired on and sunk by nK naval 
vessels in the Western Sea 
20 (ROK)   
7 Mar 73 
nK armed attack on UNC work 
party replacing MDL marker 
0654 
2 (ROK) 1 (ROK) 
15 Feb 74 
nK naval vessels attacked ROK 
fishing boats in international 
waters 
12 (ROK)   
28 Jun 74 
Three nK gun-boats attacked 
and sank a ROK Maritime Police 
craft (863) in the Eastern Sea 
near the MDL-extended 
 
26 (ROK) 2 (ROK) 
                     109 “Korea Demilitarized Zone Incidents,” GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dmz-list.htm, accessed 
August 29, 2006. 
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DATE INCIDENT NUMBER KILLED 
NUMBER 
CAPTURED 
30 Jun 75 
nK guards attacked Maj 
Henderson, acting commander of 
UNC Joint Security Force in 
JSA 
 1 (US) 
18 Aug 76 
nK guards attacked UNC guards 
during "tree-trimming 
incident" in the JSA 
2 (US) 4 (US)  
4 (ROK) 
5 (nK) 
3 May 77 
nK intruders attacked ROK Army 
personnel in the central 
sector 
1 (ROK) 1 (ROK) 
14 Jul 77 
US Army CH-47 shot down after 
it accidentally crossed MDL 
into north near east coast.  
(US casualties were returned 
via Panmunjom several days 
later) 
3 (US)  1 (US) 
28 Apr 78 
nK agent boat attacked ROK 
National Police maritime 
patrol boat 
1 (ROK) 
4 (nK)  
4 (ROK) 
21 Jul 78 nK agent boat attacked ROK National Police patrol boat 
2 (ROK) 
6 (nK) 
1 (ROK)  
7 Dec 79 
US DMZ patrol accidentally 
crossed MDL and stepped on nK 
mines. Body of US soldier 
returned by nK at 461st MAC 
Secretaries meeting. US 
wounded returned safely to UNC 
side after incident 
1 (US)  2 (US) 
23 Mar 80 
Three nK agents infiltrating 
through the Han River Estuary 
were killed by ROK defenders 
3 (nK)  
27 Mar 80 nK intruders fired on ROK Army patrol in Central Sector 
1 (ROK) 
1 (nK)  
1 (ROK) 
1 (nK) 
21 Jun 80 nK agent boat attacked ROK  Navy patrol boat  




nK agents landed on Hoenggan 
Island killing one ROK 
civilian and wounding five 
others before being caught 
3 (nK)  
1-6 Dec 
80 




3 (ROK)  




15 May 83 nK agents landed on east coast of ROK 
1 (nK)   
19 Jun 83 nK agents discovered near Munsan in the Western Corridor 
3 (nK)   
5 Aug 83 nK agents attempted to land near Kampo on the SE coast 
5 (nK)  
13 Aug 83 nK agent boat sunk east of  Ullung Island in East Sea 
5 (nK)  
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DATE INCIDENT NUMBER KILLED 
NUMBER 
CAPTURED 
3 Dec 83 nK agents landed at Tadaepo beach near Pusan 
3 (nK) 2 (nK) 
23 Nov 84 
nK guards fired on a Soviet 




1 (US)  
1 (nK) 
20 Oct 85 nK agent boat sunk near Pusan  At least 2 (nK) 
 
24 Apr 86 
nK armed vessel failed to stop 
after crossing the MDL 
extension line in the East 
Sea. nK vessel sunk in 
exchange of fire 
2 (nK)  4 (nK)  
21 Nov 87 nK guard fired on ROKA post in the Central Sector 
 1 (ROK) 
22 May 92 
nK armed intruders were 
intercepted in the central 
sector of the DMZ. UNC called 
460th MAC meeting, but nK 
rejected the meeting. 
3 (nK) 2 (ROK) 
17 Dec 94 
U.S. Army OH-58A+ helicopter 
accidentally strayed across 
the MDL about 10 km into nK 
territory and were shot down 
by nK forces. Of the crew of 
two, one was killed; the other 
was held for 13 days. 
1 (US)  
17 Oct 95 
Infiltration attempt by KPA 
soldiers near Imjin River. One 
infiltrator was killed, one 
believed to have made his way 
back to north Korea.  
1 (nK)  
06 Apr 96 
More than 100 North Korean 
troops entered the northern 
sector of the Joint Security 
Area (JSA) at Panmunjom the 
day after North Korea 
announced it had “dismissed” 
the armistice with the South. 
Both ROK and US forces were 
put on a higher state of 
alert—Watchcon 2—although 
there was no change in defense 
readiness, which was 
maintained at Defcon 4. (The 
CFC reverted to Watchcon 3 
several weeks after the April 
armistice violation.)  
  
16 Jul 97 
nK armed intruders were UNK 
(nK) UNK (nK) intercepted 
about 100 M in the ROK. 
Subsequent firefight took 
place between two nK and two 
unk (nK)  
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DATE INCIDENT NUMBER KILLED 
NUMBER 
CAPTURED 
ROK guard posts. nK intruders 
returned north. 
9 Sep 97 
nK soldier intruded south into 
the ROK, threatened a ROK 
guard, and was shot in self-
defense.  
1 (nK)  
17 Oct 97 
nK soldiers apprehend two ROK 
farmers at the MDL, east of 
Panmunjom. The nK released the 
farmers unharmed on 21 Oct. nK 
soldier intruded south into 
the ROK, threatened a ROK 
guard, and was shot in self-
defense.  
1 (nK)  
3 Feb 98 
In Panmunjom, a KPA Captain 
crossed the MDL from KPA GP#2 
and surrendered himself at UNC 
CP#4. He expressed his desire 
to defect to the ROK and 
remained, despite KPA protests 
claiming he was abducted. 
    
11 Jun 98 
The KPA fired 3-4 roundsat UNC 
GP#247.  One round hit the top 
of UNC GP#247. No casualties 
reported.    
    
22 Jun 98 
A North Korean midget 
submarine was seized after 
it was spotted entangled in 
South Korean fishing nets 
off the South Korean town of 
Sokcho, south of the DMZ.  
When brought to shore three 
days later, the nine crew 
aboard were found dead inside 
from an apparent group 
suicide. 
KPA-9    
12 Jul 98 
A body of a North Korean 
frogman was found on a beach 
south of the DMZ, along with 




KPA-1    
18 Dec 98 
In a firefight, the South 
Korean navy sank a North 
Korean Improved Semi-
Submersible Landing Craft (I-
SILC) some 150 kilometers 
southwest of Pusan. The body 
of a North Korean frogman was 
recovered near the site.  The 
vessel was first spotted two 
kilometers off the port city 
KPA-1   
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nK ships provoked a nine-day 
naval confrontation off ROK's 
western coast in disputed 
waters in the Yellow sea over 
disputed border known as the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL). 
When the confrontation ended 
in exchange of fire each 















26 Sep 00 
Two KPA soldiers cross the MDL 
in vicinity of Tae-Song-Dong. 
When challenged by ROK 
soldiers, one of the KPA 
soldiers told them their 
weapons are designed “to kill 
Americans.” No shots fired. 
    
26 Oct 00 
Two U.S. aircraft 
participating in an exercise 
in the ROK accidentally fly 
over the DMZ.  
    
2-4 Jun 
01 
Three “commercial” naval 
vessels from the DPRK cross 
the Cheju Strait in both an 
easterly and westerly 
direction.  The ROK Navy 
issued verbal warnings not to 
pass without approval, but the 
ships captains ignore the 
warnings.  
    
8 Jun 01 
A “commercial” naval vessel 
from the DPRK crossed the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL), 
entered the contiguous waters 
of the ROK, and passed north 
to the port of Nampo, despite 
warnings not to enter the 
prohibited area. 
    
19 Sep 01 
A three-man KPA patrol armed 
12 Oct 01 with AK-47 rifles 
was observed passing through 
the KPA forward fence line.  A 
UNC Guard Post (GP) issued two 
verbal warnings. The UNC GP 
fired 24 warning shots.  The 
KPA soldiers returned to the 
north. 
    
20 Sep 01 
10 KPA soldiers crossed 50 
meters south of the MDL UNC 
issued 13 voice warnings and 
five warning shots.  The KPA 
retreated to the north.  
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DATE INCIDENT NUMBER KILLED 
NUMBER 
CAPTURED 
27 Nov 01 
North and South Korean troops 
briefly exchanged fire in the 
DMZ. North Korean troops fired 
three rounds toward a UNC 
guard post  prompting the ROK 
Army unit to return fire.  One 
bullet hit and shattered a 
windowpane of a South Korean 
bunker that serves as a guard 
post. No casualties. 
    
17 Jul 03 
At 6:10 AM North and South 
Korean soldiers exchanged 
machine-gun fire near Yonchon, 
35 miles north of Seoul. The 
North Koreans fired four 
14.6mm rounds from a distance 
of 1,100 meters at ROKA 
soldiers who responded with 17 
shots from a K-3. Warning 
announcements were made on the 
ROKA loudspeaker. ROKA 
soldiers along the DMZ were 
put on alert. Three of the 
four DPRK rounds struck a ROKA 
guard post. No ROKA casualties 
were reported.     
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